Abstract: While it is known that access to physical infrastructure enhances household welfare, there are very few micro-econometric studies that analyze its role in mitigating chronic and transient poverty. This paper aims to bridge this gap in the existing literature by evaluating the impact of a large-scale irrigation infrastructure project implemented in Sri Lanka. It identifies the treatment effect of irrigation access by exploiting a situation where the government used lotteries to distribute irrigated plots. Furthermore, in order to disentangle the channels through which the irrigation reduces poverty, we extend the seasonal consumption smoothing model of Paxson (1993; "Consumption and Income Seasonality in Thailand." Journal of Political Economy 191(1):39-72) by introducing endogenous credit constraints. Using unique household level monthly panel data over a year, it is shown that with irrigation accessibility, not only the average income increases but also the patterns of income fluctuation changes and the probability of binding credit constraint declines through which transient poverty is mitigated. These empirical results suggest that irrigation infrastructure has a positive impact on reducing both chronic and transient poverty directly and indirectly by improving income and relaxing credit constraints.
Introduction
Our aim in this paper is to evaluate the role of irrigation infrastructure in mitigating the negative impact on chronic and transient poverty using household panel data from Sri Lanka. Development economists consider physical infrastructure to be an indispensable precondition of industrialization and economic development (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989) . Many empirical studies demonstrate that the development of physical infrastructure improves an economy's long-term production and income levels (Canning and Bennathan 2000; Esfahani and Ramirez 2003; Lipton and Ravallion 1995; Jimenez 1995) . For instance, Hulten, Bennathan, and Srinivasan (2006) find that in India, from 1972 to 1992, highways and electricity accounted for almost half the growth of the Solow residuals of manufacturing industries. The positive productivity effects of physical infrastructure development can be found even in rural areas and agricultural sectors (Jimenez 1995; Zhang and Fan 2004) . From these findings, it is evident that infrastructure is likely to reduce poverty by enhancing growth, because a strong positive correlation between income growth and poverty reduction has repeatedly been found in studies such as Besley and Burgess (2003) , Dollar and Kraay (2002) , and Ravallion (2001) .
In fact, an increasing amount of empirical literature focuses on the role of infrastructure in reducing poverty directly. Existing studies include Datt and Ravallion (1998) on state-level poverty in India, Van de Walle (1996) on the poverty reduction effect of irrigation infrastructure in Vietnam, Jalan and Ravallion (2003) on water supply systems, and Yemtsov (2004, 2005) on the poverty reduction effect of community-level infrastructure improvement projects on water supply systems in Georgia.
1 Among more recent studies, Del Carpio, Loayza, and Datar (2011), Dillion (2011) , and Strobl and Strobl (2011) use unique datasets to evaluate the impact of irrigation on production and consumption.
2 While these micro-econometric studies are insightful in uncovering the role of infrastructure in reducing poverty, two important issues remain largely unaddressed. The first issue is that, to the best of our knowledge, all the preceding micro-studies on the nexus between infrastructure and poverty reduction employ a static concept of poverty even though most recent poverty studies focus on its dynamic and stochastic nature (Dercon 2005; Fafchamps 2003) . It has been established that policy analyses based on static poverty can yield substantial inefficiencies in policy interventions (Jalan and Ravallion 1998) . The second issue is that there is no consensus on the channels through which irrigation infrastructure reduces poverty. Access to irrigation does not only increase household income directly by improving production but it also has indirect effects, such as changing saving and investment decisions as well as facilitating social capital accumulation (Aoyagi et al. 2010; Dillion 2011) .
This paper aims to close these gaps in the literature by evaluating the role of irrigation infrastructure in mitigating the negative impact on chronic and transient poverty. In order to address this research question, we conduct two closely related analyses. In the first part of this paper, we evaluate the overall impact of irrigation accessibility on poverty dynamics. In the second part, we disentangle three potential channels through which irrigation infrastructure reduces poverty: enhancing permanent income, changing patterns of income fluctuation, and improving access to credit. In order to identify these channels, we employ an empirical model based on the extended version of the life-cycle permanent income hypothesis for a seasonal expenditure decision, similar to Paxson (1993) , by modeling the endogenous credit constraints.
This study also differs from the previous studies in that our identification strategy relies on a natural experimental situation in Sri Lanka. 3 The government constructed a large-scale irrigation system and allocated plots to farmers in the southern area. This area has three unique features that enable us to identify the causal impact of infrastructure. First, the geographical and agro-climatic characteristics are homogenous in the area. Second, irrigation construction began in the north and gradually extended southward. Finally, the government used lotteries to randomly allocate irrigated plots to farmers. Therefore, the farmers who received plots in the north could have access to irrigation earlier than those who received land in the south. Construction had not begun in the southern areas at the time of our survey. Thus, the availability of irrigation was not selfselected by farmers. We use a unique monthly household panel dataset collected in the area through extensive field surveys exclusively for our study.
3 Natural experiments use random treatments that have arisen serendipitously (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000) . In the natural experiment approach, the economist attempts to find sources of variation in existing data that are as good as randomly assigned (Levitt and List 2009) .
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To preview the results, it is shown that irrigated households face chronic and transient poverty less than unirrigated households. Irrigation accessibility increases monthly consumption per adult by 300-400 Rs on average. We also find that monthly consumption is increased through increases in permanent income, decreases in the probability of binding credit constraints, and changes in the patterns of income fluctuation; even after controlling for these channels, we still find a significant irrigation effect for credit-constrained households. It is still insightful to show that access to irrigation infrastructure plays a significant role in reducing poverty even in a middle-income country like Sri Lanka. We also test the validity of our identification strategies to disentangle the channels as well as to evaluate the treatment effect of irrigation. In addition, we conduct a robustness test.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we describe our study site and data collection procedure in the field. Section 3 evaluates the total effect of irrigation on reducing chronic and transient poverty. Section 4 disentangles the channels of poverty reduction. In Section 5, we provide concluding remarks.
2 The WLB irrigation upgrading and extension project
Study site and natural experiment
For the sample of our evaluation study, we selected the Walawe Left Bank (hereafter, WLB) irrigation system in the underdeveloped area of southern Sri Lanka (Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka 2002). The WLB Irrigation Upgrading and Extension Project for this system was initiated in 1997 with the help of concessional loans from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), formerly the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. 4 The type of farming in the study area varies, ranging from irrigated to rainfed and chena (slash and burn) cultivation, and the project area exhibits considerable variability in cropping patterns. The main crops grown include paddy, sugarcane, banana, and other upland crops. Figure 1 depicts the study site that consists of four strata: Sevanagala, Kiriibbanwewa, Sooriyawewa, and Extension Area. This area has three notable characteristics by which we can evaluate the causal impact of irrigation infrastructure. First, the entire WLB area was agroclimatically and geographically similar before the initiation of the project. Second, since the original water source of irrigation is the Walawe Reservoir north of Sevanagala, irrigation construction began in the north and was then gradually extended to the south. When the survey data were collected in 2001, these areas were divided into three regions depending on the irrigation accessibility. The first region is Sevanagala where both irrigated and rainfed plots are included. In the second region of Sooriyawewa and Kiriibbanwewa, the construction or irrigation was completed, and all households had access to irrigation. Finally, in the third region in the south known as Extension Area, the construction was not yet started at the time of survey. Therefore, farmers in this region had no access to irrigation for the exogenous reason. However, some farmers there had access to primitive water control systems, which had been constructed with less advanced technology.
The third distinctive feature of this area is that the local government of each stratum employed a unique approach in distributing the irrigated plots to the farmers: for a significant proportion of farmers, the government employed lotteries in each stratum to allocate newly irrigated lands (Aoyagi et al. 2013) . Even for non-lottery-assigned lands, the exact routes of the irrigation canals were not known prior to construction, which implies that farmers' access to irrigation was not self-selected.
While these features help us identify the causal impact of holding irrigated plots, three issues remain. First, there may be a placement bias if socio-economic characteristics, such as access to cities, differ between the irrigated and unirrigated groups. Furthermore, older farmers who settled in the project area earlier may be more likely to obtain irrigated plots. Therefore, despite the fact that the government used lotteries, access to irrigation may not be perfectly random. Hence, we control for the geographic and demographic characteristics in order to mitigate bias in estimating the treatment effect of irrigation. Second, if the tenancy markets are active, farmers holding rainfed plots still can use the irrigated plots. Thus, the estimated impact of irrigated land holding may involve a downward bias. Even if this problem applies, we still evaluate the impact of irrigated plot ownership rather than usage because we are also interested in poverty reduction through improved access to credit markets. Third, since the farmers started to use the irrigated plots just before the survey, the observed irrigation effect may be lower than the effect irrigation can potentially achieve. This may also cause the downward bias. Thus, the estimated irrigation effect may be interpreted as the lower bound of the treatment effect.
Data survey
Approximately 75,000 people reside in the WLB, including government allottees, encroachers, and nonfarm households, i.e. landless people. In order to select representative sample households, we adopted a multistage stratified random sampling strategy using a complete list of all the households, which is summarized in This dataset includes three important variables to investigate the poverty dynamics: an indicator variable of the credit constraint, monthly consumption, and monthly income. It is important to consider the credit constraints in attempting to understand the role of irrigation in poverty reduction, because it may improve access to credit, therefore reducing transient poverty. However, regular household surveys do not include credit information that directly enables identification of the prevailing credit conditions (Scott 2000) . To deal with this issue, we carefully designed a special credit module in our questionnaire to directly identify credit-constrained households. In particular, we asked two related questions. First, we inquired about the amount of credit a household obtained in a particular period; then, among those who had not obtained credit, we asked the reasons for not having borrowed. Households that indicated that they did not need to borrow are defined as credit unconstrained, while households listing such reasons as fear of default or impossibility of borrowing are defined as credit constrained. Of the households that borrowed, those able to borrow as much as they wanted are considered unconstrained, while the others are considered constrained. This indicator captures the excess demand for consumption and investment credit with respect to the overall market, including formal and informal lenders.
We calculate the head count ratio using the $2.00 per day poverty line converted into the local currency using PPP. The overall incidence of poverty is~12%. The highest head count ratio is observed in the Extension Area, 14%, and the lowest poverty rate is found in Kiriibbanwewa, 8%. These figures indicate that accessibility to irrigation infrastructure is systematically related to the incidence of poverty. One may be concerned that this poverty level is not The Role of Infrastructure in Mitigating Poverty Dynamics severe compared to the levels of other developing economies. However, the measurement based on static poverty does not capture the severity of transient poverty, which is our main interest in this paper. Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the used variables. The unirrigated group includes farmers who own only rainfed land and/or land with primitive water control, as well as nonfarmers.
In Table 3 , we provide decomposition results of an expenditure-based poverty index using the framework of Ravallion (1988) and Kurosaki (2006) . Per adult equivalent scale. We employ the age-sex weights used by Townsend (1994) in the context of Southern India. Monthly consumption consists of food and nonfood consumption including nondurable expenditures comprising items such as medical care and education. Monthly income data are calculated by aggregating income from the sale of crops, the imputed value of self-production, income from noncrop agriculture such as livestock, and wages from agricultural and nonagricultural sources.
We can define aggregate measures of total poverty, P, chronic poverty, P C , and transient poverty, P T , for a population of N households:
} where E i is the consumption level of individual i and z is a poverty line. 5 We use total expenditure data for the consumption level, E i , and calculate the expected values by computing sample averages for the 12 months October 2001-September 2002. We utilize the poverty gap measure by setting that α ¼ 2.
The poverty line is set at 1.25 US dollars based on the World Bank's purchasing power parity adjusted by the local consumer price index (World Bank 2013). The table shows that households without irrigation are more likely to suffer from chronic poverty than households with irrigation, although the difference seems to be small. However, this result may be attributed to the heterogeneity of household characteristics. Thus, we carefully address this issue in the next section.
Irrigation effects on poverty dynamics
While access to irrigation was not self-selected because of the use of lottery, still there may be potential bias as discussed in the previous section. Hence, we first adopt the propensity score matching method to quantify the policy impact of irrigation. The propensity score of irrigation accessibility at the beginning of the survey is estimated using a logit model. However, our data do not include information regarding the pretreatment period, such as income and assets prior to irrigation placement. Hence, to estimate the propensity score, we use a set of covariates that are considered to be almost time-invariant, such as the Note: The decomposition is based on the poverty gap measure. The poverty line is set at 1.25 US dollars.
5 Chronic poverty indicates the state where the welfare level is below a given poverty line at each instant of the period, while the transient poverty goes below the poverty line for at least one instant, but does not stay continuously below the line (Ravallion 1988) .
The Role of Infrastructure in Mitigating Poverty Dynamics age, schooling years, and gender of household heads and the number of males and females aged 16 or over. We do not use the data on land holdings and geographic characteristics because they are determined after the allocation of irrigated plots. The treatment variable takes a value of unity if the household owns irrigated land, and zero otherwise. The sample households of the Extension Area are not used in this model since they do not have access to irrigation for exogenous reasons. Table 4 presents the results of the logit estimation of the propensity score. It indicates that households with more members and/or with older heads are more likely to have access to irrigation in the earlier stage. These findings are consistent with our expectations and seem to reject the possibility of exogenous or random placement of irrigation facilities.
The validity of the estimated propensity score is verified using the balancing score test of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Wahba (1999, 2002) : conditional on the propensity score, the covariates should be independent of access to irrigation. It is shown that the means of the covariates are not significantly different between the irrigated and rainfed areas for any bundle of propensity scores, which supports the validity of selection on the observables assumption. We further test the conditional independence of the irrigation placement in Appendix. We conduct the matching estimation using the observations within the common support. We estimate the treatment effects of irrigation separately for five periods -the yearly average effect (full sample estimation), the harvest season, the planting season, the rainy season, and the dry season -using three matching methods to construct the matched group: radius matching, kernel matching, and first nearest neighbor matching.
In Table 5 , the estimation results show a significant causal impact of irrigation infrastructure on consumption, income, and the probability of binding credit constraints. The effects of irrigation on monthly consumption per adult equivalent scale are positive and statistically significant in 13 out of 15 specifications, and the estimated treatment effects range from 313.6 to 389.7 Rs with the full sample. In contrast, the impact on monthly income is significant only during the harvest season. The insignificant impact on income during the plant season is plausible because, while the availability of irrigation induces higher yields, it requires more valuable inputs during planting seasons. This is supportive evidence for the impact of irrigation on changing the patterns of income dynamics. Finally, irrigation accessibility also reduces the probability of binding credit constraints by around 4% during the dry seasons.
Potential channels of poverty reduction
While the analyses in Section 3 show the significant poverty reduction effects of irrigation, they do not identify how irrigation influences poverty dynamics. Therefore, in this section, we disentangle the channels through which irrigation reduces poverty. Firstly and the most importantly, access to irrigation changes the level and fluctuation patterns of income (Del Carpio, Loayza, and Datar 2011; JBIC and IWMI 2002; Strobl and Strobl 2011) ; not only does irrigation allow farmers to grow more valuable crops during the dry season, it may also allow more intensive cultivation during the rainy season. Moreover, poor households in developing countries, which are typically comprised of landless farmers, have only limited access to credit (Foster 1995) . For them, access to irrigation may mitigate the negative impact of binding credit constraints; while irrigation accessibility potentially affects the demand for credit by changing income fluctuation patterns, it could also improve creditworthiness.
To consider these channels explicitly, we extend Paxson's (1993) seasonal consumption smoothing model by introducing endogenous credit constraints. We then apply the theoretical results to formalize the empirical model. Notes: #T and #C indicate the number of observations used in the matching estimation from the treatment and control groups, respectively. The matching estimation uses the monthly observations. The propensity score is considered not to change over a year. Bootstrap standard errors are reported in the Kernel matching, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Modeling the role of infrastructure in poverty reduction dynamics
Each household determines seasonal consumption by maximizing its lifetime utility subject to its intertemporal budget constraints. Here we assume tentatively that all of the households have perfect credit market accessibility. A household has a time-separable constant relative risk aversion utility function,
(1-a) −1 , of the household consumption, C st , in season s in year t. For purposes of exposition, we exclude the year subscript in the following presentation. α s represents a taste parameter, and a is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The household's decision problem is to choose C st that maximizes the discounted lifetime utility with a seasonal discount factor, β, subject to an intertemporal budget constraint with seasonal income, Y st ; household assets at the beginning of the period, W; and an exogenous seasonal interest rate, r ; R-1. Assuming no consumption tilting, i.e. βR ¼ 1, we have the following optimal expenditure for season s:
where E s * ¼ P s C s with P j representing the price of consumption in season s; ω and Π are utility weights assigned to consumption in season s and total household assets, respectively; i.e. they correspond to the sum of human and initial physical assets. Note that eq.
[1] is an extended version of the life-cycle permanent income hypothesis. The utility weight involves the taste parameter in the utility function and the relative consumption prices in the two periods. Defining Y as the sum of expenditures in different periods, we have Y ¼ RΠ because ∑ s ω s ¼ 1. Note that Y measures the total annual income, inclusive of net annual interest earnings for the year. Thus far we have assumed perfect credit market accessibility. In order to introduce the possibility of binding credit constraints captured by income volatility, we follow Flavin (1981) and Paxson (1993) and assume that the expenditure at s is a weighted average of the optimal expenditure at s and income in that season:
where π represents the degree of credit constraint. 
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The potential irrigation effects can be captured by three parameters in this equation: permanent income, Y, income fluctuation patterns, A s , and credit constraints, π.
Empirical strategies to identify the channels
To quantify the relative importance of the different channels, we consider the following estimation equation:
where Y s is endogenous permanent income; X s includes time-invariant characteristics, such as demographics, geographic characteristics, and the unirrigated land holdings (the rainfed land and land with primitive water controls); Z s is the size of irrigated land allocated by the government, and its coefficient γ Z represents a time-invariant premium of irrigated lands through non-income channels, presumably such as changes in preferences; and, following Paxson (1993) , γ s 0 denotes common month-specific fixed effects, reflecting month-specific preferences and prices. The three terms, X s γ X ; γ Z Z s ; and γ Thus far, we have formalized two channels through which irrigation increases consumption: permanent income and patterns of income fluctuation. We next incorporate the impact of irrigation through mitigating the credit constraint into this estimation equation. A conventional empirical approach to examine the credit constraints ignores the endogeneity of the constraints, and exogenously splits the sample into those constituents likely to be credit constrained and those not likely to be so (Foster 1995) . In contrast, following Jappelli (1990) , we introduce an empirical model of endogenous credit constraint. Recall that E* represents the optimal LC-PIH consumption in the absence of current credit constraints. Then, E* ¼ E holds if the credit constraint is not binding, while E* > E holds if the credit constraint is binding. A discrete model of credit constraint is obtained as follows:
where 1 [.] denotes an indicator function for a discrete variable of credit constraint which is defined in Section 2, cc; S includes binary variables to represent unanticipated water shortages in the rainy and dry seasons; and ε denotes an error term that captures unobserved elements and a measurement error. Finally, we combine eq.
[5] with the seasonal expenditure model of eq.
[4]. Accordingly, we have the following econometric models of expenditure with and without endogenous credit constraints in which sample selection correction terms are included under joint normality of the error terms (Lee 1978; Amemiya 1985) :
where superscripts C and N denote the credit-constrained and unconstrained groups, respectively, and φ (.) and Φ(.) represent the probability density and cumulative density functions of standard normal distribution, respectively. We expect that γ Y,C and γ Y,N are positive and β 2 is negative. It is also predicted that γ 6 In our empirical models, the error terms in eqs [5]-[7] are assumed to follow trivariate joint normal distribution. As shown in Arabmazar and Schmidt (1982) , however, if this assumption does not hold, it is likely that the second step estimators are seriously biased. Therefore, we employ a semiparametric analysis to relax the normality assumption by adopting the approach proposed by Lee (1982) . The qualitative results are comparable under the relaxed assumption.
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Results
This subsection consists of four parts. First, we discuss the main findings regarding the potential channels of poverty reduction. Second, to test the validity of the identification strategy to disentangle the channels, we examine another testable hypothesis of Paxson's (1993) model based on eq. [3] . Third, we test the conditional independency to show the validity of our identification strategy to evaluate the treatment effect of irrigation. Finally, we conduct a test for robustness.
Main findings
We attempt to estimate eqs [5]- [7] by addressing the endogeneity of two variables: permanent income, Y, and the credit constraint, cc. We first mitigate the endogeneity of the permanent income variable using the instrumental variable method. After careful investigation of 16 types of agricultural assets and 18 types of nonagricultural assets, we decide to employ the holding of sewing machines and small tractors as our instruments.
7 As shown below, these instruments satisfy the condition in the over-identification tests.
It is also important to show the determinants of permanent income, since one of the most obvious channels of poverty reduction is likely to be an increase in annual income overall. Therefore, we regress the permanent income, which is approximated by the average household income per adult equivalent scale over 12 months, on a set of household human and physical asset variables. 8 Table 6 reports the estimation results.
9 Irrigated land size has positive and statistically significant coefficients on permanent income. For farmers with average sized irrigated plots (0.5 acre per adult equivalent scale), addition of one-acre plots increases the permanent income by~29.6%. The estimated impact of the primitive water control is higher than that of irrigation. This is possibly because of the downward bias discussed in Section 2. Furthermore, differences in experience and the exposure of stable water sources may generate this seemingly perverse pattern: while the farmer with the primitive water control has water access for a long time, irrigation has been available only a short time.
Human and physical asset variables, such as the age of the head of household, number of adult male members, and ownership of sewing machines are also positively related to the level of permanent income. Other types of physical infrastructure, such as access to markets and paved roads, also significantly increase permanent income. However, providing irrigation to a one-acre plot has a larger impact than paving roads or reducing the distance to markets by 1 km. Notes: Robust standard errors are reported. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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The negative coefficients of females and children could be created by the use of an adult equivalent scale. The impact of education is positive and statistically significant for households with heads of the mean age.
Next, we examine the roles of irrigation in mitigating the credit constraint. According to Table 7 , the coefficients of irrigated land variables are jointly significant; for farmers holding 0.5 acre of irrigated land, an increase in the land holding decreases the probability of binding credit constraints by 1.6%. This result presumably reflects two channels. First, loan provisions are positively affected by access to irrigation facilities through enhanced solvency. Second, the irrigation accessibility might reduce the demand for credit by increasing farmers' asset holdings. Notes: Standard errors are reported. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level. For dummy variables, discrete marginal effects when the variable shifts from zero to one are reported.
The first and second columns in Table 8 report the estimation results for the household expenditure model after controlling for the endogenous permanent income and credit constraints, respectively -that is, eqs [6] and [7] . First, we confirm that permanent income has a significantly positive effect. The coefficient for the unconstrained group is close to unity, while that of the constrained group is lower, which is consistent with the theoretical model. The irrigation impact during the reference period (planting in the rainy season) is positive and significant; for farmers holding irrigated plots of average size, a one-acre increase in irrigated land increases consumption for the constrained group by 5.9%. By combining this result with the season-specific effects, γ Z;C s and γ Z;N s , it is shown that irrigation has a particularly positive impact on credit-constrained households during rainy seasons, although this is not necessarily consistent with the result based on the propensity score matching method. While the season-specific effects of irrigated land size through income on expenditure are not always significant, the joint F test for these effects shows that irrigation has an overall significant time-varying effect on household expenditure for the constrained group. In contrast, for the unconstrained group, the overall seasonspecific effects are not different from zero. These results are consistent with the theoretical implications of the intertemporal model of consumption decisions with and without binding credit constraints, by which, given a constant level of permanent income, the patterns of income fluctuation should affect consumption only for credit-constrained households.
The validity of identification strategy to disentangle the channels
This subsection tests another important theoretical prediction based on Paxson (1993) to show the validity of our empirical model. Specifically, we estimate eq. [3] with the endogenous credit constraint of eq. [5] . By including the sample selection correction terms under joint normality of error terms, the estimation versions of eqs [3] and [5] become
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S.E. The third and fourth columns in Table 8 On the other hand, the monthly income coefficient for the unconstrained households, π N , is not statistically different from zero. Consumption by the constrained group tracks the fluctuated income path, suggesting that people under credit constraint cope with negative economic shocks by reducing consumption. By contrast, the unconstrained group is able to smooth over their consumption paths during income fluctuation. The results summarized here provide supportive evidence for our empirical strategy.
The validity of conditional independency of irrigation placement
This subsection tests the conditional independency between irrigation accessibility and household expenditure, which is a fundamental identification condition to evaluate the treatment effect of irrigation. The parameters, γ k Z , capture the extra expenditure that farmers can achieve with irrigation access; these are the season-specific treatment effects of irrigation infrastructure. However, the correlation between consumption and unobserved determinants of irrigation accessibility has the potential to generate the omitted variable bias in the estimated coefficients.
In order to avoid this bias, the conditional independence condition must be satisfied between irrigation accessibility and household expenditure given the other control variables. Conditional independence indicates that even if irrigated households did not have access to irrigation, the consumption level of such hypothetical households would have been comparable with that of actual unirrigated farmers conditional on observed household characteristics. However, it can be difficult to test this condition directly, because normally we cannot observe the counterfactual outcomes directly.
Alternatively, we employ an indirect testing procedure originally proposed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and recently formulated by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009, 46-50) . A key requirement for this approach is the existence of households that do not have irrigation accessibility for an exogenous reason. If such households exist, we can utilize the testable implication that the consumption level should not significantly differ between those without irrigation for exogenous reasons and those without irrigation for endogenous ones.
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As described in Section 2, irrigation construction had not begun in the Extension Area at the time of the data survey. We categorize the observations in this area as unirrigated farmers for exogenous reasons. On the other hand, Sevanagala includes both unirrigated and irrigated farmers. Irrigation accessibility in this area might or might not have been determined exogenously despite the fact that the government used lotteries to allocate irrigated.
To test conditional independence, we construct a dummy variable that takes a value of unity for the samples of the Extension Area, and zero otherwise. Then, we estimate eqs [8] and [9] with the explanatory variables used in the previous estimations as well as the regional dummy variable. If conditional independency is satisfied, the coefficient of the regional dummy variable should be statistically insignificant. As a result, the regional dummy variables are statistically insignificant at the 10% level in eqs [8] and [9] . This result provides supportive evidence for conditional independency.
Robustness tests
For a robustness test, we incorporate the household fixed effects for our empirical analysis. Our careful examination exploiting the natural experimental situation shows that it satisfies a necessary condition for the conditional independence of irrigation accessibility, but it cannot directly test the sufficient condition of conditional independency. Therefore, we include household fixed effects to mitigate the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and program placement. We reserve the endogeneity issue of the credit constraint and simply estimate eqs [6] and [7] with the household fixed effects. We only summarize the results here and more details are available upon request, but the estimation results are the same qualitatively as the previous results without household fixed effects.
Conclusions
In this paper, we identify a relationship between infrastructure development and poverty reduction with regard to seasonal fluctuations in consumption expenditure using a unique panel data set from irrigated and unirrigated areas in southern Sri Lanka. There are two important robust findings emerged from our econometric analyses: Frist, we find that irrigation reduces chronic poverty by improving permanent income; and second, irrigation also eliminates the negative impact of transient poverty by reducing downside expenditure risk. These findings are also consistent with theoretical implications of a canonical model of intertemporal consumption decisions under potentially binding credit constraints. Our results provide evidence in support of the role of infrastructure in reducing both chronic and transient poverty. Since very few micro-econometric studies have analyzed the role of infrastructure in mitigating chronic and transient poverty, we believe that this paper will fill an important gap in the existing literature.
proposed by Rosenbaum (2002) for the conditional independence of the irrigation placement. The null hypothesis for the test is that the treatment effect is zero given a hidden bias caused by an unobserved variable that affects the irrigation placement. The amount of the hidden bias is specified as Γ, for which Γ ¼ k means that the odds ratio of receiving the treatment can be k times larger in the worst case than without the bias. The rejection of the null hypothesis with a large value of Γ ¼ k suggests the robustness of the existence of the treatment effect, even under unobserved elements. We apply this test by following DiPrete and Gangl (2004) for the results of four specifications showing significant treatment effects in the nearest neighbor matching model: consumption (full sample), income (harvest season), consumption (harvest season), and consumption (planting season). We find supporting evidence for the existence of positive irrigation effects for the first and third specifications, while the other two specifications show the potential for a hidden bias causing the overestimation of the treatment effects. 
